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ENTERPRISE CULTURE AND ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS:  
NEW MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: The paper argues that enterprise culture is producing negative effects. 
Companies and major accountancy firms are increasingly willing to increase their 
profits through indulgence in price fixing, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery, corruption, 
money laundering and practices that show scant regard for social norms and even laws. 
 
Methodology/Approach: The paper locates business behaviour within the broader 
dynamics of capitalism to argue that hunger for higher profits at almost any cost is not 
constrained by rules, laws and even periodic regulatory action. 
 
Findings: The paper uses publicly available evidence to show that accountancy firms 
are engaged in anti-social behaviour. Evidence is provided to show that in pursuit of 
higher profits firms have operated cartels, engaged in tax avoidance/evasion, bribery, 
corruption and money laundering.  
 
Practical implications (if applicable): The paper seeks to bring the anti-social 
activities of accountancy firms under scrutiny and thus extend possibilities of research 
in social responsibility, ethics, accountability, claims of professionalism, social 
disorder and crime. 
 
Originality/value of paper:  It is rare for accounting scholars to examine predatory 
practices of accounting firms. It shows that predatory practices affect a variety of  
arenas and  stakeholders. 
 
Article Type: A research paper. 
 
Keywords: Enterprise culture, accounting firms, cartels, bribery and corruption, tax 
avoidance, money laundering 
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ENTERPRISE CULTURE AND ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS:  
NEW MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
With the contemporary triumph of enterprise culture and its pursuit of wealth creation, 
corporations have become the dominant economic, social and political force of our 
times. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, fifty-one of the hundred largest 
economies in the world were corporations, not countries. The five largest companies 
had combined sales greater than the gross domestic product (GDP) of the poorest 46 
nations. The combined sales of the top 200 corporations were bigger than the 
combined economies of all countries minus the big ten, and accounted for over a 
quarter of world economic activity (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000). Such clout has 
given corporations enormous power and scope for controlling markets, prices, jobs, 
pensions, news, medicines, food, water, communications, transport and the 
environment. Yet the power of enterprise culture is not necessarily being used in the 
wider social interest. With the support of the state, corporations have pursued higher 
profits by participating in wars, genocide, racism, slavery and repression (Black, 2001; 
Booth et al., 2007; Klein, 2007). In the search for competitive advantage, they seem to 
be willing to indulge in price-fixing, bribery, corruption, money laundering, tax 
avoidance/evasion and a variety of anti-social activities that affect the life chances of 
millions of citizens (Baker, 2005; Gasparino, 2005; Kochan, 2006; Connor, 2007; 
Christensen, 2007). 
 
The expansion of enterprise culture has been aided by accounting technologies that 
emphasise private property rights and appropriation of economic surpluses (Johnson, 
1972, 1980). Auditing technologies seek to foster trust and encourage the belief that 
companies are not corrupt and their directors are accountable to a variety of 
stakeholders. Accountancy firms lubricate the wheels of capitalism through a variety 
of advisory services to enable capital to advance its interests. Through the provision of 
such technologies many accountancy firms themselves have become international 
businesses and significant promoters of enterprise culture. They simultaneously share 
and shape much of the contemporary entrepreneurial culture. The world of accounting 
is dominated by just four accountancy firms1 whose combined global income of 
US$80 billion (Appendix 1) is exceeded by the GDP2 of only 54 nation states, giving 
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them enormous clout for influencing regulators and contesting unwelcome policies. In 
recent years, considerable scholarly attention has focused on the expansion and growth 
of accountancy firms (Hanlon, 1994; Burrows and Black, 1998; Daly and Schuler, 
1998; Grey, 1998; Barrett, et al., 2005), but there is little exploration of the darker side 
of accountancy firms and whether in pursuit of profits their entrepreneurial energies 
too might be used for anti-social practices, including price-fixing, bribery, corruption, 
money laundering and tax avoidance/evasion. 
 
The paper seeks to encourage debates about the consequences of the enterprise culture. 
In particular, it seeks to encourage reflections on some questionable practices by 
accountancy firms which increase profits, but harm citizens. Such practices are located 
within the broader dynamics of capitalist societies where corporations use a variety of 
tactics to increase profits and offer high rewards for their executives. Since 
accountancy firms are also capitalist organisations they are also likely to have 
absorbed some of these practices. The paper is divided into three further sections. The 
next section provides a framework for appreciating how enterprise culture might 
persuade companies to engage in questionable practices to increase private profits. 
Some evidence is provided by showing that despite laws and regulatory action, 
companies continue to engage in price-fixing cartels, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery 
and corruption and money laundering. The next section focuses upon accountancy 
firms and argues that the enterprise culture also encourages accountancy firms to 
engage in questionable practices. Some evidence is provided to show that that despite 
laws and regulations, accountancy firms too are engaged in price-fixing cartels, tax 
avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption and money laundering. As the jurisdiction 
external auditing is considered to be informed by professional ethics, this section also 
provides some evidence to show that this arena is susceptible to predatory practices as 
well. The final section summarises the paper and discusses its significance and 
implications for research. 
 
THE UNIVERSE OF ENTERPRISE CULTURE 
 
The triumph of the West, western ideas and the alleged exhaustion of viable alternatives 
to liberalism has anointed capitalism as the dominant social, economic and political 
system of our time (Fukuyama, 1992). Corporations, particularly multinational 
corporations, are the motor of capitalism. With the active support of the state, 
 5
dismantling of trade barriers, advances in information technologies and through a variety 
of networks, corporations have become “the most powerful political forces of our time” 
(Klein 2001, p. 339). 
 
Though created through law and numerous social contracts, corporations do not owe 
allegiance to any nation, community or locality (Bakan, 2004). Elected governments and 
host communities may be interested in eradicating poverty, promoting education, 
healthcare and human rights, but corporations may not necessarily share such goals. 
They are essentially ‘private’ organisations and are required by law to prioritise the 
welfare of shareholders (capital) above other stakeholders. To legitimise their social 
power corporations may acknowledge some social responsibilities, but they cannot buck 
the systemic requirement to increase profits and dividends for the benefit of capital. In 
this competitive process corporations develop new products, services and niches and 
also squeeze a variety of stakeholders to achieve higher shareholder value (Kennedy, 
2000). This has been accompanied by a variety of strategies to improve corporate 
earnings through financial engineering, dilution of wages and workers’ pension rights 
(Froud et al., 2006; Mitchell and Sikka, 2006). Corporate executives are also showing 
willingness to increase profits by operating cartels and by engaging in or facilitating 
money laundering, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption (Connor, 2007; 
Kochan, 2006; Shaxson, 2007; UK Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006). Such 
practices seem to be part of an ‘enterprise culture’ that persuades many to believe that 
`bending the rules' for personal gain is a sign of business acumen. Stealing a march on a 
competitor, at almost any price, to gain financial advantage is considered to be an 
entrepreneurial skill, especially where competitive pressures link promotion, status, 
profits, market shares and niches with meeting business targets. With the average tenure 
of chief executives at major quoted companies at four years, and falling (The 
Independent, 29 December 2006), the temptation is to build high personal financial 
rewards as soon as possible. The recipients of high rewards are often elevated as role 
models and their very success in ‘sailing close to the wind’ poses challenges to the social 
norms which might have constrained predatory behaviour. A UK government report 
noted that some corporations and their directors have “… cynical disregard of laws and 
regulations … cavalier misuse of company monies … a contempt for truth and common 
honesty (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1997, p. 309). 
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In principle, predatory practices could be checked by public regulation and enforcement, 
but such discourses and practices are highly problematic. With increased state 
dependence on private capital to stimulate economic activity, corporate interests have 
become central to contemporary domestic and foreign policymaking and dilute 
enthusiasm for vigorous regulatory activity. Corporations can dilute threatening policies 
through lobbying, sponsorship of political parties, prominent politicians, trade 
association, think-tanks and the media (Broder, 2000). The sheer volume of daily 
transactions and the related costs of surveillance make regulators selective in their focus 
and have to assume that corporations will be constrained by laws and social norms. In 
any case, corporations are able to ‘capture’ regulators because regulators rely upon 
‘expert’ knowledge and much of this is grounded in the vocabularies and values that 
privilege corporate interests. Consequently, despite the claimed advances in 
transparency, accountability and corporate social responsibility, large tracts of business 
activity remain relatively opaque (Levitt, 2002). For example, company accounts rarely 
provide any information about the involvement of corporations in anti-social practices, 
such as money laundering, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption, or their social 
consequences (Mitchell et al., 2002; Murphy, 2006). 
 
Anti-social practices have negative effects on ordinary people’s quality of life and their 
access to material and symbolic goods and services, but they rarely have the necessary 
resources to check corporate power and can easily be silenced by laws of libel 
(Sampson, 2004). Since corporate power depends on patronage of the state, citizens 
expect the state to create appropriate regulatory frameworks and make power 
accountable. As the state’s legitimacy depends on mass support it is obliged to be seen to 
be checking corporate excesses, but this increasingly has to compete with processes that 
safeguard the long-term wellbeing of capital. In a world system of nation states, some 
seek competitive advantage and are either unable or unwilling to check predatory 
enterprise culture (Baker, 2005). Some lack the political, financial and administrative 
resources to constrain big business. Neoliberalist ideologies also limit the capacities of 
the state with claims that robust regulatory activity violates privacy and property rights, 
stifles innovation, reduces wealth creating opportunities, dilutes economic activities, 
forces capital to migrate to other less constrained pastures and in the process threatens 
jobs, social stability and revenues (e.g. taxation) that the state needs for its own survival 
(Levitt, 2002; Gasparino, 2005). Inevitably, the state’s capacity to develop and enforce 
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regulation is constrained by financial and ideological imperatives. The resulting vacuum 
has created space for a variety of questionable practices that increase corporate profits 
but also undermine the social fabric and welfare of citizens.  
 
The remainder of this section provides some evidence about the involvement of 
corporations in cartels, tax avoidance, bribery and corruption and money laundering. 
 
Cartels 
 
In neoliberal ideology ‘the customer is king’ and competition offers choices, but 
numerous companies have operated price-fixing cartels to reduce consumer choice and 
earn monopoly rents (Connor, 2007). As a key sponsor of capitalism, the state has 
enacted a variety of anti-trust laws to persuade corporations that competition and 
consumer choices are desirable, but this has to compete with pressures to increase profits 
and personal financial rewards. So a variety of cartels have been operationalised. For 
example, major UK supermarkets have been fined £260 million for colluding to fix the 
price of dairy products (UK Office of Fair Trading press release, 20 September 2007). 
UK retailers Argos and Littlewoods entered into agreements to fix the prices of toys and 
games (UK Office of Fair Trading press release, 19 February 2003). Fifty of the UK's 
leading private schools were found guilty of running an illegal price-fixing cartel to 
drive up fees (The Guardian, 10 November 2005). Fifteen major US drug companies 
agreed to pay more than $408 million to settle a lawsuit charging them with “conspiring 
to illegally fix prices that they charged to thousands of independent pharmacies” (New 
York Times, 10 February 1996). British Airways has admitted that it colluded with 
Virgin Atlantic over the surcharges added to ticket prices in response to rising oil prices. 
(UK Office of Fair Trading press release3, 1 August 2007). The French regulators fined 
glamour perfume brands, Chanel, Yves Saint Laurent, Christian Dior and Guerlain for 
operating a cartel (Daily Telegraph, 15 March 2006). Samsung, a major manufacturer of 
electronic equipment pleaded guilty and was fined US$300 million for participating in 
an “international conspiracy to fix prices” (US Department of Justice press release4, 13 
October 2005). The European Commission fined brewers Heineken, Grolsch and 
Bavaria nearly €274 million for operating a cartel on the beer market in The 
Netherlands. (European Commission press release, 18 April 2007). The Commission 
also fined Otis, KONE, Schindler and ThyssenKrupp for operating cartels for the 
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installation and maintenance of lifts and escalators in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands (European Commission press release, 21 February 2007). Eleven 
companies, including ABB, Alstom, Areva, Fuji Electric, Hitachi Japan, AE Power 
Systems, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Schneider, Siemens, Toshiba and VA Tech 
“rigged bids for procurement contracts, fixed prices, allocated projects to each other, 
shared markets and exchanged commercially important and confidential information” 
(European Commission press release, 24 January 2007). The European Commission has 
fined five oil and chemical companies, including, Eni and Royal Dutch Shell for fixing 
the price of synthetic rubber (European Commission press release, 29 November 2006). 
Seemingly, no part of life is immune from cartels. 
 
The above examples provide a brief glimpse of practices crafted by high ranking 
company executives. These may turn profit maximising directors into media stars, but 
also squeeze customers, usually hitting the poorest the hardest, by forcing them to pay 
higher prices. Neoliberals also complain that cartels damage free and competitive 
markets, but companies appear to have a considerable appetite for such practices. 
 
Tax Avoidance 
 
The availability of taxation revenues are crucial to any attempt by the state to redistribute 
wealth, alleviate poverty and provide a variety of public goods covering education, 
healthcare, security, pensions, public transport, clean water and other services and make 
a difference to quality of life and even survival. Yet corporations often see tax avoidance 
schemes as simply another ‘cost reduction’ programme rather than a practice that 
undermines social solidarity and the development of a just and fair society.  
 
The US, with extreme levels of income inequalities and with it access to education and 
healthcare is estimated to be losing over $300 billion of tax revenues each year (US 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) press release5, 14 February 2006). Companies use a 
wide variety of tax avoidance schemes, tax havens and shell companies to avoid taxes 
and increase their earnings (US Government Accountability Office, 2004a, 2004b). 
The demise of Enron and WorldCom provided a glimpse of complex tax avoidance 
schemes. For example, with advice from Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Chase 
Manhattan, Deutsche Bank, Bankers Trust and several major law firms Enron operated 
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through a labyrinth of 3,500 domestic and foreign subsidiaries and affiliates (US 
Senate Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003). Many were located in tax havens and 
enabled the company to structure its transactions to avoid taxes at home and abroad. 
With advice from KPMG, WorldCom used a variety of strategies to avoid taxes at 
home and abroad. Transfer pricing techniques alone enabled it to amass $20 billion of 
revenues on which it paid little or no corporate taxes (US Bankruptcy Court Southern 
District of New York, 2004). 
 
The culture of tax avoidance is widespread. A government report showed that 61% 
percent of the US domiciled corporations paid no federal income taxes for the years 
1996 to 2000. Nearly 38% of the large companies (with more than $250 million in assets 
or $50 million in revenues) paid no taxes during the five-year period. An estimated 94% 
of corporations reported tax liabilities of less than 5% of their income in 2000. Around 
71% percent of foreign-controlled corporations paid no taxes on their US income and 
89% had liabilities of less than 5% of their income (US Government Accountability 
Office, 2004a, 2004b). Major US companies also avoid paying state taxes (McIntyre and 
Coo Nguyen, 2005). 
 
The UK Treasury is estimated to be losing between £97 billion and £150 billion of tax 
revenues, between 8% and 12% of GDP, each year (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006). The 
amounts are significant for a country with almost the lowest state pension in Western 
Europe (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006) and a lamentable record for dealing with child 
poverty (UNICEF, (2007). A government study relating to the 700 biggest companies, 
reported that 220 companies paid no corporation tax and a further 210 paid less than 
£10m each in 2005-2006 (National Audit Office, 2007). Around Two thirds of the 
corporation tax total came from just three industries - banking, insurance and oil and gas. 
Almost 70 per cent of all UK corporation tax in the 2005/6 financial year was paid by 
just 50 companies. Alcohol, tobacco, car and real estate sectors contributed only a few 
hundred million pounds. Whilst there may be perfectly legitimate reasons for lower 
corporation tax bills, evidence shows that corporate taxes as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) have been declining and taxes have been shifted to labour and 
consumption (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005).  
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Developing countries may be losing around US$385 billion of tax revenues each year, 
dwarfing all the loans, donations and foreign aid put together (Cobham, 2005). The 
loss of such vital non-returnable revenues constrains investment in education, 
healthcare, clean water or combating disease and has deadly results. Whilst the average 
life expectancy in Japan, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden and France is over 80 years, 
in Swaziland it is only 39.6 years (United Nations, 2007). Tax revenues could greatly 
aid development and quality of life. For example, every $100 million could fund 3.3–
10 million insecticide-treated bednets; or treatment for over 600,000 people for one 
year for HIV/AIDS; or 50-100 million dosages of treatments for malaria; or full 
immunizations for 4 million children; or water connections for some 250,000 
households; or  240 kilometers of two-lane paved road (World Bank, 2007).  Yet the 
thirst for greater corporate profits rarely connects with the consequences for humanity. 
 
Bribery and Corruption 
 
Though somewhat contentious to define, bribery and corruption remain major features 
of the world economy. In general, the practices involve attempts to gain unfair 
advantage (Shaxson, 2007). A large part of bribery and corruption occurs at the 
interface between the private and public sectors, between government officials and 
companies seeking competitive opportunities to earn excessive profits by offering 
kickbacks and secret commissions to intermediaries. According to international 
financier George Soros, “international business is generally the main source of 
corruption” (Financial Times, 8 December 1998) and Transparency International adds 
that “Bribe money often stems from multinationals based in the world’s richest 
countries” (Transparency International, 2007). Bribery and corruption hurt the poor. 
As a UK legislator put it, the “cost of bribes falls primarily on the poor. When a 
corrupt contractor from this or some other rich country pays a 15 per cent. bribe, he 
adds that to the price of his contract. His power station or irrigation scheme will cost 
more, and the little people - those who buy the electricity or the water to irrigate their 
crops - will pay the price of that bribe. Bribery is a direct transfer of money from the 
poor to the rich” (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 25 February 1998, col. 374). 
 
Despite the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD) 
convention on corruption (OECD,1997), which has been implemented by many 
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countries, the level of corruption and bribery has increased and is estimated to be over 
US$1 trillion each year (UK Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006). A large 
amount of corruption and bribery is also associated with the looting of countries by 
their rulers, a process that frequently carries the fingerprints of corporations. Corrupt 
“leaders of poor countries skim as much as US$40 billion each year and stash their 
looted funds overseas” (World Bank press release, 17 September 2007; also see World 
Bank, 2007). A UK parliamentary report adds that “In many cases western companies 
and western agents have been guilty of offering and paying bribes to government 
officials to secure contracts and other advantages. Western banks have been implicated 
in laundering the proceeds of corruption and western shell companies and trusts have 
been set up to facilitate this. Western financial experts have also been accused of 
assisting corrupt officials to launder their illicit funds ... numerous cases that 
demonstrate the role played by foreign companies in Africa in paying bribes, and 
facilitating other forms of corruption (UK Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006, 
p 20). China, an emerging economy with large foreign investment, claims to have 
investigated 24,879 cases of commercial bribery, including the operations of the 
French supermarket chain Carrefour and Germany-based Siemens, involving 6.16 
billion yuan (US$819.15 million) in the first half of 2007 alone (China Daily, 19 
September 2007). In 2006, World Bank barred 330 companies from participating in its 
contracts on grounds of corruption (Financial Times, 6 August 2006).  
 
Corporations are also involved in corruption in their home countries. The UK Police 
records suggest that the “single greatest source of corruption in the UK is large public 
sector contracts and concessions issued to private companies, both of which have 
increased under privatisation” (Hawley, 2000). The corporate hand in bribery and 
corruption is sometimes given visibility by regulatory reports. For example, US drug 
manufacturer Johnson and Johnson admitted that some of its subsidiaries “made 
improper payments in connection with the sale of medical devices in two small-market 
countries” (New York Times, 13 February 2007; The Times, 14 February 2007). The US 
conglomerate Baker Hughes Incorporated pleaded guilty to three charges of corruption 
and was fined $44 million for hiring agents to bribe officials in Nigeria, Angola 
Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Amongst other things the company “paid 
approximately $5.2 million to two agents while knowing that some or all of the money 
was intended to bribe government officials, specifically officials of State-owned 
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companies, in Kazakhstan” (SEC press release6, 26 April 2007). Textron Inc, a US 
aviation and defence company operating from 32 countries was fined $4.7 million for 
allegedly paying bribes to win contracts in Iraq. Its “subsidiaries allegedly made illicit 
payments … to secure thirty-six contracts in the United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and India from 2001 to 2005” (SEC press release7, 23 August 2007; 
also see US District Court Southern District of Texas, 2007). Two former “Siemens 
managers have been convicted by a German court of their involvement in paying 6m 
euros (£4.1m; $8m) in bribes to win [power generation] contracts (BBC, 14 May 20078).  
 
In principle, the governments could check predatory practices, but often in the pursuit of 
‘national interests’ some are reluctant to investigate allegations of bribery (UK Africa 
All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006). More recently, the UK government abruptly 
ended its investigation of alleged bribes paid by arms manufacturer BAE Systems to 
Saudi Arabia officials, through a series of onshore and offshore companies and bank 
accounts, to secure sales of weapons. The reason advanced was that it might harm 
exports and cause loss of jobs (The Guardian, 15 December 2006; 15 January 2007; 24 
April 2007; 9 May 2007; 7 June 2007; 21 September 2007). 
 
Money laundering 
 
In the era of electronic transfers of money and easy mobility of capital, money 
laundering is considered to be a major challenge as it has the capacity to finance 
corruption, narcotics, smuggling, theft, crime, private armies, pervert democracy and 
fuel inequalities. Money laundering is facilitated by banks, financial services companies, 
multinational corporations, shell companies and networks of business advisers (UK 
Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006; Financial Action Task Force, 2006). The 
US government acknowledges that “shell companies are being used to launder as much 
as $36 billion from the former Soviet Union … and conceal money movements” (US 
Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 33).  
 
The World Federation of United Nations Associations estimates that the proceeds of 
organised crime are around US$2 trillion (The Guardian, 12 September 2007) whilst the 
World Bank estimates that between US$1 trillion and US$1.6 trillion is lost each year to 
various illegal activities including corruption, criminal activity such as drugs, counterfeit 
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goods, money, and illegal arms trade and tax evasion (World Bank, 2007). Others 
estimate that after including the cost of fighting, money laundering is estimated to cost 
the world economy some US2.5 trillion each year (Kochan, 2006). To combat the threat 
of money laundering most governments have devised anti-money laundering laws which 
require banks and financial services entities to implement suitable systems of internal 
controls and policies to identify their customers and suspicious transactions – sometimes 
known as “know your customer” (or KYC). Such policies and records can be examined 
by law enforcement agencies, but are failing as Baker (2005) argues that US anti-money 
laundering efforts “succeed 0.1 percent of the time and fail 99.9 percent of the time” (p. 
173). One possibility is that corporate responses to laws may not necessarily be aligned 
with broader social interests and corporations may have developed strategies of creative 
compliance (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2004, 2005a).  
 
A US government report noted that “the New York branch of ABN AMRO, a banking 
institution, did not have anti-money laundering program and had failed to monitor 
approximately $3.2 billion – involving accounts of US shell companies and institutions 
in Russian and other former republics of the Soviet Union” (US Government 
Accountability Office, 2006, p. 31). The case of the US based Riggs Bank9 provides an 
insight into the creative compliance strategies that might be developed in pursuit of 
profits. The bank “disregarded its anti-money laundering (AML) obligations … despite 
frequent warnings from … regulators, and allowed or, at times, actively facilitated 
suspicious financial activity” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
2004, p. 2). The Committee chairman Senator Carl Levin stated that the “the ‘Don’t ask, 
Don’t tell policy’ at Riggs allowed the bank to pursue profits at the expense of proper 
controls …Million-dollar cash deposits, offshore shell corporations, suspicious wire 
transfers, alteration of account names – all the classic signs of money laundering and 
foreign corruption made their appearance at Riggs Bank10”.  
 
The Senate Committee report stated that “Over the past 25 years, multiple financial 
institutions operating in the United States, including Riggs Bank, Citigroup, Banco de 
Chile-United States, Espirito Santo Bank in Miami, and others, enabled [former Chilean 
dictator] Augusto Pinochet to construct a web of at least 125 U.S. bank and securities 
accounts, involving millions of dollars, which he used to move funds and transact 
business. In many cases, these accounts were disguised by using a variant of the 
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Pinochet name, an alias, the name of an offshore entity, or the name of a third party 
willing to serve as a conduit for Pinochet funds” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, 2005a, p. 7). The Senate report states that “In addition to opening 
multiple accounts for Mr. Pinochet in the United States and London, Riggs took several 
actions consistent with helping Mr. Pinochet evade a court order attempting to freeze his 
bank accounts and escape notice by law enforcement” (US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, 2004, p. 28). The Senate report stated that the Riggs 
bank’s files and papers contained “no reference to or acknowledgment of the ongoing 
controversies and litigation associating Mr. Pinochet with human rights abuses, 
corruption, arms sales, and drug trafficking. It makes no reference to attachment 
proceedings that took place the prior year, in which the Bermuda government froze 
certain assets belonging to Mr. Pinochet pursuant to a Spanish court order - even though 
… senior Riggs officials obtained a memorandum summarizing those proceedings from 
outside legal Counsel” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2004, p. 
147). The bank’s profile did not identify General Pinochet by name and at times he is 
referred to as “a retired professional, who achieved much success in his career and 
accumulated wealth during his lifetime for retirement in an orderly way” (p. 25) … with 
a “High paying position in Public Sector for many years” (p. 26) …whose source of his 
initial wealth was "profits & dividends from several business[es] family owned" (p. 147) 
… the source of his current income is "investment income, rental income, and pension 
fund payments from previous posts " (p. 147).  
 
ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS 
 
The preceding section explored some aspects of the enterprise culture. It showed that 
in pursuit of higher profits some corporations indulge in cartels, tax avoidance/evasion, 
money laundering, bribery and corruption. Some have developed creative compliance 
strategies. Such practices are partly encouraged by secrecy, poor regulatory 
environment and the relative absence of any moral constraints. Though accountancy 
firms distinguish their expert labour from competitors by appealing to claims of 
professionalism and ethical codes, they too are capitalist organisations whose success 
is measured by increases in fees and profits. Since making profits by ‘bending the 
rules’ is a prominent feature of enterprise culture, accountancy firms may also be 
susceptible to such practices, especially as their “emphasis is very firmly on being 
commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being public 
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spirited on behalf of either the public or the state” (Hanlon, 1994, p. 150). Employees 
of major firms are inculcated into prioritising the interests of clients and know that 
their career progression depends on this (Grey, 1998). In the words of a senior partner, 
“a firm like ours is a commercial organization and the bottom line is that … the 
individual must contribute to the profitability of the business … essentially 
profitability is based upon the ability to serve existing clients well” (Hanlon, 1994, p. 
121). Such ideologies may increase profits, but can be socially dysfunctional as 
evidenced by auditor failures to report frauds by UK media mogul Robert Maxwell. In 
this case, a senior partner of Coopers & Lybrand had told staff that the “first 
requirement is to continue to be at the beck and call of RM [Robert Maxwell], his sons 
and staff, appear when wanted and provide whatever is required” (UK Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2001, p. 367). 
 
Accountancy firms compete against each other and occupants of adjacent jurisdictions 
for profit making opportunities. However, it is the state guaranteed market of external 
auditing that has provided the springboard for commercial expansion of accounting 
firms. Compared to their competitors, auditing gives the firms an easy access to senior 
management and sell a wide variety of consultancy services, including advice on 
executive compensation, executive recruitment, financial engineering, mergers and 
acquisitions, tax avoidance, trade union busting, printing T-shirts, badges, laying golf 
courses and even inspection of toilets11. Since the late 1970s major firms diversified 
into a variety of consultancy services to increase their profits (Zeff 2003a, 2003b). The 
firms shifted “from providing one-to-one tax advice in response to tax inquiries to also 
initiating, designing and mass marketing of tax shelter products” (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005b, p. 9). Lynn Turner, SEC chief 
accountant from 1998-2001, explained that “Today they [major firms] are a business 
firm, and the CEOs and culture at the top of these firms is, "What can we do [to] make 
our business more profitable12? Reflecting the contemporary enterprise culture, many 
companies aggressively sought to increase their profits through financial engineering 
or avoidance of rules and accountancy firms have been in the thick of it.  
 
Any temptation to indulge in predatory practices could be checked by reflections on 
the possible consequences, but experienced observers claim that accountancy firms 
have a history of "turning a blind eye on the wholesale abuse by client company 
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directors of [legal] provisions" (Woolf,1983, p. 112) and “disclosing considerably less 
than what they actually know" (Woolf, 1986, p. 511). The chairman of Coopers & 
Lybrand (now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) publicly stated that, "there is an 
industry developing, and we are part of it, in standards avoidance" (Accountancy Age, 
19 July 1990, p. 1). A partner from a medium-size firm was bold enough to say “No 
matter what legislation is in place, the accountants and lawyers will find a way around 
it. Rules are rules, but rules are meant to be broken” (The Guardian, 18 March 2004).  
 
Perhaps, the conservatism traditionally associated with accounting firms could dampen 
the zeal to increase profits through predatory activities, but the steady dilution of 
auditor liability laws has eroded conservative attitudes. As Stiglitz (2003) put it, “there 
are plenty of carrots encouraging accounting firms to look the other way … there had 
been one big stick discouraging them. If things went awry, they could be sued … In 
1995, Congress adopted legislation intended to limit securities litigation … in doing 
so, they provided substantial [liability] protection for the auditors. But we may have 
gone too far: insulated from suits, the accountants are now willing to take more 
“gambles” … (p. 136). The less onerous auditor liability laws have also been 
introduced in the UK and other countries (Sikka, forthcoming). 
 
In principle, the predatory activities of accountancy firms could be checked by 
regulators, but there are considerable complexities in crafting regulatory structures. In 
common with other fractions of capital, accountancy firms fund and lobby political 
parties to secure regulatory concessions (Roberts et al., 2003). They have enjoyed a 
close and complex relationship with the state and have been able to marginalise issues 
about their accountability (Sikka and Willmott, 1995). In Anglo-Saxon countries, 
accounting business has enjoyed self-regulation, albeit in a statutory framework, which 
has primarily been focused on the state guaranteed markets of auditing and insolvency. 
The regulatory apparatus has rarely examined the governance of accounting firms, or 
explored how they negotiate systemic pressures to increase profits (Sikka, 2004).  In 
general, despite their social power, accountancy firms are not even subjected to the 
disclosure requirements13 applicable to equivalent companies or public sector bodies. 
Some may look towards standard setting agencies to provide benchmarks for 
accountancy firm accountability, but major firms often provide finance and personnel 
to such agencies and are able to stymie threatening developments (Sikka, 2002; Loft et 
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al., 2006). The burgeoning domestic and international auditing standards are silent on 
the social obligations of accountancy firms.  
 
Against the background of comparative secrecy, relatively weak liability, 
accountability, regulatory, moral and ethical pressures, accountancy firms have 
become key players in the contemporary enterprise culture and have shown a 
willingness to indulge in questionable practices not only to increase their clients’ but 
also their own profits. The remainder of this section provides some evidence to show 
that the firms co-operate to operate price fixing cartels and other arrangements to 
advance their economic interests. This has been accompanied by practices relating to 
tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption and money laundering. This is also 
supplemented by evidence relating to the auditing arena to show that questionable 
practices take place in the accounting firms’ traditional jurisdiction as well. 
 
Cartels 
 
There are numerous opportunities for accountancy firm partners to get together 
whether through their membership of the councils of accountancy bodies, at standard 
setting bodies, or at government sponsored and social events, and advance their 
common interests. In the year 2000, Consob, the Italian Competition Authority fined 
Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand [now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers], Deloitte 
& Touche, KPMG, Price Waterhouse [now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers], Reconta 
Ernst & Young, the then Big-Six accounting firms, for operating a cartel14. The firms 
had “agreements to substantially restrict competition on the auditing services market in 
Italy … covered virtually every aspect of competition ... the agreements set the fees for 
auditing … rules to be followed when acquiring new clients in order to protect the 
market positions of each firm. In particular these rules prohibited any form of 
competition in relation to each audit firm's "client portfolio". By applying these rules, 
the auditing firms were able to agree, for example, on how to respond to requests for 
discounts from client companies, and to establish in advance the firm that would be 
awarded auditing contracts, in many cases making competitive tendering a mere 
formality. Other agreements were also designed to ensure anti-competitive behaviour 
by the auditing firms for public tenders and when establishing agreements with the 
authorities. …”. 
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 Accountancy firms also form alliances to protect their niches. In November 2005, 
France introduced legislation restricting the ability of auditing firms to sell non-
auditing services to audit clients. It imposed a ban on offering an audit if the client has 
received other services from the audit firm in the previous two years. This had the 
potential to enhance auditor independence, but could possibly reduce firm income and 
was therefore not welcome. So the Big Four firms and Grant Thornton formed an 
alliance to contest the law with the complaint that “They’ve taken the rules on auditor 
independence in the Eighth Directive too far” (Accountancy Age, 20 September 2007). 
The firms are now jointly fighting the French government on the grounds that French 
law is incompatible with European Union directives and have theatened to take the 
matter to the European Court of  Justice (The Times, 28 March 2006; Accountancy 
Age, 4 April 2006; 20 September 2007). Previously, Ernst & Young and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers combined forces to pressurise the UK government to secure 
liability concessions in the shape of limited liability partnerships. They had threatened 
to relocate their UK business to the offshore tax haven of Jersey (Sikka, forthcoming). 
As the UK government eventually capitulated an Ernst & Young senior partner 
boasted, “It was the work that Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse undertook with 
the Jersey government … that concentrated the mind of UK ministers on the structure 
of professional partnerships. …The idea that two of the biggest accountancy firms 
plus, conceivably, legal, architectural and engineering and other partnerships, might 
take flight and register offshore looked like a real threat … I have no doubt whatsoever 
that ourselves and Price Waterhouse drove it onto the government’s agenda because of 
the Jersey idea” (Accountancy Age, 29 March 2001, p. 22).  
 
In competitive markets, producers often poach their competitors’ clients and personnel, 
especially if the competitor is under distress. Accountancy firms freuquently poach key 
staff from each other, but this policy was suspended whilst KPMG was under scrutiny. 
Since late 2003, KPMG had been under regulatory scrutiny in the US for facilitating 
tax evasion and was fined $456 million (see below). This could have persuaded other 
firms to poach staff and clients or engage in competitive practices to win new clients, 
but the three largest accounting firms, apparently all independent of each other, 
“ordered their partners not to poach clients or personnel from KPMG while it remains 
under investigation” (Daily Telegraph, 24 August 2005). This policy could have been 
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driven by their self-interest as the demise of KPMG may have persuaded regulators to 
break-up the remaining Big three firms to enhance competition. 
 
Accountancy firm partners frequently earn fees by acting as expert witnesses in court 
cases. The same expertise could also be used to advance cases of negligence and fraud 
brought against major firms. The New Zealand case of Wilson Neill  v Deloitte - High 
Court, Auckland, CP 585/97, 13 November 1998 revealed that “The major accounting 
firms have in place a protocol agreement promising that none will give evidence 
criticising the professional competence of other Chartered Accountants” (reported in 
the (New Zealand) Chartered Accountants’ Journal, April 1999, p. 70). The case 
against Deloitte was dismissed because of insufficient evidence of negligence. 
 
Tax Avoidance 
 
Commentators say that there are “armies of accountants in the City of London [are] 
trained in the dark arts of tax minimisation” (The Daily Telegraph, 2 September 2007). 
UK legislators claim that “Britain's corporation tax revenues are under relentless attack 
from several multinational companies and the global accountancy firms' mass 
production of tax avoidance” (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 February 2005, 
col. 992). US legislators have expressed concern that the “sale of potentially abusive 
and illegal tax shelters has become a lucrative business in the United States, and some 
professional firms such as accounting firms … are major participants” (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 4).   
 
A US government study reported that accountancy firms, in their capacity as auditors, 
are major sellers of tax avoidance schemes, some of which turn out to be abusive (US 
Government Accountability Office, 2005). An insight into the role of accountancy 
firms in designing and marketing abusive tax avoidance schemes was provided by a 
report by the US Senate Committee on Permanent Investigations (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003) on the operations of KPMG. The 
Senate inquiry found that KPMG created a “Tax Innovation Center” which was treated 
as a profit centre and its staff were subjected to periodic performance assessments to 
increase revenues. It also had a “Tax Services Idea Bank” which encouraged staff to 
submit new ideas for tax avoidance schemes, together with an estimate of the revenue 
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potential and key client targets. The Center “maintained an inventory of over 500 
“active tax products” designed to be offered to multiple clients for a fee … [its aim 
was] to become an industry leader in producing generic tax products” (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 2, 25). The Senate report 
estimated that as much as $85 billion may have been lost because of abusive and 
questionable tax shelters (p. 21). 
 
The Senate report stated that “None of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee 
derived from a request by a specific corporation or individual for tax planning advice 
on how to structure a specific business transaction in a tax-efficient way; rather all of 
the transactions examined by the Subcommittee involved generic tax products that had 
been affirmatively developed by a firm and then vigorously marketed to numerous, in 
some cases thousands, of potential buyers” (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2003, p. 2). The Senate hearings found that KPMG used “aggressive 
marketing tactics to sell its generic tax products, including by turning tax professionals 
into tax product salespersons, pressuring its tax professionals to meet revenue targets, 
using telemarketing to find clients, using confidential client tax data to identify 
potential buyers, targeting its own audit clients for sales pitches, and using tax opinion 
letters and insurance policies as marketing tools” (p. 4). KPMG personnel were trained 
in cold-calling techniques, instructed to “respond aggressively at every opportunity” 
(p.50) and disarm sceptical clients with the claims that “many of the [KPMG] 
specialists are ex-IRS employees … Many sophisticated clients have implemented the 
strategy in conjunction with their outside counsel” (p. 59). Client presentations were 
done on chalkboards or erasable whiteboards, and written materials were retrieved 
from clients before leaving a meeting. Potential clients had to sign “non-disclosure” 
agreements. 
 
For a number of years US tax professionals have been required to register the tax 
avoidance schemes marketed by their organisations with the tax authorities. Those 
failing to do so could face civil and criminal penalties. The Senate report found that 
despite “its 500 active tax product inventory KPMG has never registered, and thereby 
disclosed to the IRS the existence of, a single one of its tax products ...” (p. 13). The 
Senate report stated that senior tax professionals urged the firm “to knowingly, 
purposefully, and willfully violate the federal tax shelter law” (p. 13). In an internal 
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communication, a senior KPMG professional reasoned that “the IRS was not 
vigorously enforcing the registration requirement, the penalties for noncompliance 
were much less than the potential profits from selling the tax product …” (p.13). The 
Senate report states for just one of the abusive tax avoidance schemes the “KPMG tax 
professional coldly calculated the penalties for noncompliance compared to potential 
fees” and said: “Based upon our analysis of the applicable penalty sections, we 
conclude that the penalties would be no greater than $14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG 
fees. ... For example, our average …deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with 
a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000.” The senior tax professional also 
warned that if KPMG were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this 
action would place the firm at such a competitive disadvantage in its sales that KPMG 
would “not be able to compete in the tax advantaged products market.” (p. 13). 
Following the critical Senate report KPMG promised to curb some of its activities, but 
was soon found to be marketing aggressive avoidance schemes (New York Times, 26 
August 2004) leading to further condemnations by the Senate Committee (US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005b). 
 
After further investigations by the US tax authorities, KPMG and nineteen (current and 
former) personnel were charged with conspiring to “defraud the IRS by designing, 
marketing and implementing illegal tax shelters” in what the Department of Justice 
described as “the largest criminal tax case ever filed” (press release15, 17 October 
2005). KPMG, the firm, avoided prosecution, but “admitted to criminal wrongdoing 
and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties as part of an 
agreement to defer prosecution of the firm” (Department of Justice press release16, 29 
August 2005).  One of the KPMG [former] tax partners told a court, “I willfully aided 
and abetted the evasion of taxes” and added that the illegal schemes were “designed 
and approved by senior partners and leaders at KPMG and other entities to allow 
wealthy taxpayers to claim phony losses on their tax returns through a series of 
complicated transactions … so that KPMG and other entities could earn significant 
fees” (The San Diego Union Tribune, 9 April 200617). In January 2007, a former 
KPMG tax consultant, pleaded guilty to “participating in a conspiracy to defraud the 
United States Treasury, evade taxes and file false tax returns18”. He stated that “a 
former partner in KPMG’s Los Angeles office paid him $600,000 to pose as a private 
hedge fund owner and manager of several entities that were used to advance the tax 
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shelter known as short options strategy. He also stated that at the direction of a KPMG 
partner “he lied to an IRS agent about his and [KPMG partner’s] roles in marketing the 
shelters”19. 
 
Inevitably, there are legal wranglings about prosecutions, especially as the US 
prosecutors insisted that KPMG personnel should not be able to get financial help from 
the firm to fight their cases. Such a restriction was considered to be a violation of their 
constitutional rights and in July 2007, a US court20 dismissed charges against 13 
KPMG personnel because the restriction had prevented them from presenting their 
defence (New York Times, 17 July 2007). The US Justice Department is considering 
the possibilities of an appeal (New York Times, 19 July 2007). 
 
Attention has also focused on other accountancy firms. A US Senate report stated that 
“PricewaterhouseCoopers sold generic tax products to multiple clients, despite 
evidence that some … were potentially abusive or illegal …” (US Senate Committee 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005b, p. 7). The role of Deloitte & 
Touche in crafting tax avoidance schemes for Enron is under scrutiny (US Senate Joint 
Committee on Taxation, 2003). The firm had also been under scrutiny in the US state 
of North Carolina for designing “unemployment-insurance tax shelters”. Government 
officials claimed that the “scheme basically involves setting up phony corporations and 
then shifting employees into those new corporations because new corporations 
generally pay lower unemployment-insurance tax rates than do older companies with 
an established history of layoffs … as many as 150 companies may have used the 
technique, which is illegal …21” (Miami Herald, 19 March 2004).  
 
Following the Senate Committee conclusion that Ernst & Young (E&Y) sold “abusive 
or illegal tax shelters” (US Senate Committee Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2005b, p. 6), the US Justice Department charged “four current and 
former partners of Big-Four accounting firm Ernst & Young ("E&Y") with tax fraud 
conspiracy and related crimes arising out of tax shelters promoted by E&Y … the 
defendants and their co-conspirators concocted and marketed tax shelter transactions 
based on false and fraudulent factual scenarios to be used by wealthy individuals with 
taxable income generally in excess of $10 or $20 million to eliminate or reduce the 
taxes they would have to pay the IRS” (US Justice Department press release22, 30 May 
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2007). The accompanying 72 page indictment sheet23 alleges that the firm had 
elaborate organisational structures for designing and marketing tax avoidance schemes, 
which through a series of complex transactions either eliminated, or deferred taxes. 
The schemes were mass-marketed and sceptical clients were reassured by what the 
Justice Department alleges were: "false and fraudulent opinion letters" from leading 
law firms (see paras 15 and 62 of the indictment sheet). The Justice Department 
alleges that the defendants took active steps to prevent the tax authorities from 
becoming aware of the nature of the schemes by directing "destruction of documents 
which would reveal the true facts surrounding the design, marketing and 
implementation" (para 29). Internal emails allegedly said that there "should be no 
materials in the clients' hands - or even in their memory … a fax of the materials to 
certain people in the ... government would have calamitous results" (para 39 and 46). 
So far one former Ernst & Young employee has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
commit tax fraud and “acknowledged that she and her co-conspirators also took steps 
to disguise the fact that all the steps of the transactions were all pre-planned from the 
beginning24" (New York Times, 15 Jun 2007).  
 
The sale of tax avoidance schemes in other countries is also under scrutiny. For 
example, a UK Tax Tribunal found that KPMG cold-called on clients to sell a scheme 
that would boost corporate earnings by avoiding sales tax (or Value Added Tax 
(VAT)). The scheme involving use of offshore tax havens and complex corporate 
structures was declared unlawful by the Tribunal25 and subsequently the European 
Court of Justice described it as “unacceptable” (The Observer, 27 March 2005). Ernst 
& Young marketed a scheme to enable retailers to boost earnings by avoiding VAT 
and levying a credit handling fee on credit card sales. Under the scheme retailers 
would claim that 2.5% of all credit card sales were a “card handling fee” and not 
subject to VAT as financial services are exempt. Thus for an item of £100, the retailer 
would account for VAT on the sale price of £97.50 only and keep the other £2.50 as a 
service charge. The scheme was declared unlawful by a Tax Tribunal26 and a UK 
Treasury spokesperson described it as "one of the most blatantly abusive avoidance 
scams of recent years" (The Guardian, 19 July 2005). In September 2007, another 
Ernst & Young designed scheme to enable companies to use complex instruments 
known as ‘tax-efficient off-market swaps’ was declared unlawful27. It could have lost 
the UK Treasury £1 billion of tax revenues (Accountancy Age, 27 September 2007).  
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 Some questions have also been posed about the firms’ own tax computations. For 
example, it was reported (Wall street Journal, 14 October 2005) that KPMG “used one 
of its own mass-marketed corporate-tax strategies to record a $34 million deduction on 
its 2001 tax return, just months before the Internal Revenue Service listed the strategy 
as an abusive tax-avoidance transaction”. The US IRS is also “conducting a special 
audit of PricewaterhouseCoopers … studying the firm's accounts going back to 2001” 
(The Daily Telegraph, 28 August 2006). The Australian press reported that “partners 
from leading tax firm KPMG were hit with a claim for up to $100 million in unpaid 
taxes and penalties for allegedly breaching … anti-avoidance tax laws. [Australian 
Taxation Office] claimed that KPMG partners had channelled such a high proportion 
of their income through the trusts that the sole or dominant purpose of the trusts must 
have been to avoid paying tax” (Sydney Morning Herald28, 17 May 2004, 18 May 
2004). It was also reported that “Ernst & Young admitted it had settled a multimillion-
dollar tax claim [with the Australian Taxation Office] over income splitting through 
service trusts …29” (Sydney Morning Herald, 18 May 2004). Following a raid on its 
Moscow office and three court hearings the Russian arm of Pricewatehousecoopers 
paid 290 million roubles to cover its backtaxes (The Times, 10 March 2007). 
 
Bribery and Corruption 
 
Some questions about the possible role of accounting firms in incidences of alleged 
bribery and corruption are raised after public revelations about their audit clients. For 
example, following claims that Siemens paid over £1 billion in bribes to secure 
contracts German prosecutors are looking at whether Siemens’ auditor, the German 
arm of KPMG ignored questionable payments on the conglomerate's books (Wall 
Street Journal, 2 March 2007). It is alleged that KPMG did not do enough to flag 
improprieties (Wall Street Journal, 4 May 2007). Questions have also been raised 
about KPMG’s failure to report alleged bribes paid by BAE, UK’s largest arms 
company, to secure arms contracts (The Guardian, 8 March 2004) 
 
Serious questions are also raised when, as sellers of consultancy services, accounting 
firms compete with a variety of other suppliers, or when accountancy firms prioritise 
the interests of a client in a situation that is contested by regulators. Might they be 
 25
tempted to seek competitive advantage by paying kickbacks or shield clients by 
withholding co-operation with regulators? Following evidence provided by a 
whistleblower in September 2004, the US authorities charged PricewaterhouseCoopers 
[and IBM] for paying kickbacks to secure government contracts. In August 2007, the 
US Justice Department30 announced that “IBM Corporation and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers have both agreed to pay the United States more than $5.2 
million to settle allegations that the companies solicited and provided improper 
payments and other things of value on technology contracts with government agencies 
… PWC will pay $2,316,662”. The government press release stated that “PWC 
knowingly solicited and/or made payments of money and other things of value, known 
as alliance benefits, to a number of companies with whom they had global alliance 
relationships. The government intervened in the actions because the alleged alliance 
relationships and resulting alliance benefits amount to kickbacks, as well as 
undisclosed conflict of interest relationships in violation of contractual provisions and 
the applicable provisions of the federal acquisition regulations”.  
 
In July 2005, the US Department of Justice announced that PricewaterhouseCoopers 
paid the government $41.9 million to “resolve allegations that it defrauded numerous 
federal government agencies over a 13-year period31”. The government lawsuit had 
alleged that between 1990 and 2003 “PwC charged the government agencies 
substantially more for travel expenses and credit card purchases than the firm actually 
spent. An investigation by the government following the filing of the lawsuit 
determined that PwC overbilled the government because its bills failed to take into 
account commissions, rebates and incentives given to PwC by travel companies and 
charge card issuers”. The lawsuit had alleged that PwC management had been made 
aware of the problem through internal complaints by several partners, but it made no 
effort to refund the overpayments to the government. The court evidence contained 
internal emails from one partner in which he described the firm’s practice as “a bit 
greedy” (Wall Street Journal, 30 September 2003). Previously, an Arkansas judge 
fined PricewaterhouseCoopers $50,000 for destroying documents related to an 
overbilling lawsuit (Wall Street Journal, 19 September 2003). 
 
In January 2006, the US government announced that Ernst & Young and KPMG 
settled lawsuits “concerning false claims allegedly submitted to various agencies of the 
 26
United States in connection with travel reimbursement.  … E&Y has agreed to pay 
$4,471,980 and KPMG has agreed to pay $2,770,000 … firms received rebates on 
travel expenses from credit card companies, airlines, hotels, rental car agencies and 
travel service providers. The companies did not consistently disclose the existence of 
these travel rebates to the United States and did not reduce travel reimbursement 
claims by the amounts of the rebates … knowingly presented claims for payment to the 
United States for amounts greater than the travel expenses actually incurred” 
(Department of Justice press release32, 3 January 2006) 
 
The involvement of accountancy firms in bribery and fraud is highlighted by the New 
York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau’s testimony33 to the US Senate 
Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations on 16 July 2001 (also see New York 
Times, 4 May 1995). Morgenthau explained34 that “a private debt trader in 
Westchester County, New York, formerly a vice president of a major U.S. bank, set up 
shell companies in Antigua with the help of one of the "big five" accounting firms; 
employees of the accounting firm served as nominee managers and directors. The 
payments arranged by the accounting firm on behalf of the crooked debt trader 
included bribes paid to a New York banker in the name of a British Virgin Islands 
company, into a Swiss bank account; bribes to two bankers in Florida in the name of 
another British Virgin Islands corporation; and bribes to a banker in Amsterdam into a 
numbered Swiss account. Because nearly all the profits in this scheme were realized in 
the name of the off-shore corporations or off-shore accounts, almost no taxes were 
paid”.  The shell company in the above case went under the name of Merlin Overseas 
Limited. There was no actual physical business in Antigua, named Merlin. It consisted 
of little more than a fax machine in a Caribbean office of Price Waterhouse (New York 
Daily News, 10 January 1999). Robert Morgenthau stated that “This accounting 
company was complicit … They facilitated hiding of bribes that were paid to bank 
officers, and they provided the officers and directors for those phoney companies” 
(New York Daily News, 10 January 1999). Morgenthau prosecuted the trader at the 
centre of the scheme but could not put his hands on Price Waterhouse. The district 
attorney’s office asked Price Waterhouse in Manhattan for help in reaching the people 
behind Merlin, but the help was not forthcoming. They were told that the Price 
Waterhouse in Antigua is not the same legal creature as the one in New York. 
Morgenthau added, “If you changed the name Pricewaterhouse to Gotti or Gambino, 
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the stunts in Antigua would bar them from towing cars or picking up trash, much less 
auditing sensitive financial transactions worth billions of dollars” (New York Daily 
News, 10 January 1999). 
 
Money Laundering 
 
Money laundering requires secrecy, knowledge of global financial systems and ability 
to structure transactions to disguise their origins and destinations. Money laundering is 
lucrative because intermediaries can collect as much as 20% of the money laundered as 
a fee (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002). Regulators claim a “growing role played by 
professional services providers. Accountants … turn up ever more frequently in anti-
money laundering investigations. In establishing and administering the foreign legal 
entities which conceal money laundering schemes, it is these professionals that 
increasingly provide the apparent sophistication and extra layer of respectability to 
some laundering operations (Financial Action Task Force, 1999, p. 12; also see 
Financial Action Task Force, 2006). A recent Australian government study stated that 
amongst others “… accountancy profession to be [most] associated with money 
laundering” (Stamp and Walker, 2007, p. 69). The US Treasury highlighted a case and 
added that “several shell companies were involved … The scheme was of great 
sophistication and had a veneer of respectability provided by the cooperation of so 
many professionals including … accountants ... [Our] investigation uncovered a 
complex scheme to defraud investors through the unprecedented use of newly created 
shell companies, paper transactions, and false reports” (Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network, 2006, p. 10).  
 
In July 2007, as part of Australia’s largest-ever tax fraud and money laundering probe, 
millionaire Glenn Wheatley was jailed for 15 months. Wheatley pleaded guilty to not 
paying more than $300,000 in tax by hiding money in an [unnamed] Swiss-based 
accounting firm and engaging in bogus offshore transactions (Sydney Morning Herald, 
1 Februay 2007). However, money laundering also takes place onshore and Britain's 
failure to regulate front and shell companies has made it a haven for money laundering 
(The Guardian, 30 October 2004) and such structures have been used by accountancy 
firms to launder money. Mitchell et al (1998a, 1998b) document a case study in which 
27 shell companies were used to launder money. The paper trail went from Tunisia, 
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London, the Isle of Man and Jersey to France and beyond. Most of the companies 
never traded, but millions passed through their bank accounts. A High Court 
judgement stated that "Mr. Jackson and Mr. Griffin knew .... of no connection or 
dealings between the Plaintiffs and Kinz or of any commercial reason for the Plaintiffs 
to make substantial payments to Kinz. They must have realised that the only function 
which the payee companies or Euro-Arabian performed was to act as "cut-outs" in order 
to conceal the true destination of the money from the Plaintiffs ... to make it impossible 
for investigators to make any connection between the Plaintiffs and Kinz without having 
recourse to Lloyds Bank's records; and their object in frequently replacing the payee 
company by another must have been to reduce the risk of discovery by the Plaintiffs”. 
“Mr. Jackson and Mr. Griffin are professional men. They obviously knew they were 
laundering money. .... It must have been obvious to them that their clients could not 
afford their activities to see the light of the day. Secrecy is the badge of fraud. They must 
have realised at least that their clients might be involved in a fraud on the plaintiffs”. 
Jackson & Co. were introduced to the High Holborn branch of Lloyds Bank Plc. in 
March 1983 by a Mr Humphrey, a partner in the well known firm of Thornton Baker 
[now part of Grant Thornton]. They probably took over an established arrangement. 
Thenceforth they provided the payee companies... In each case Mr Jackson and Mr 
Griffin were the directors and the authorised signatories on the company's account at 
Lloyds Bank. In the case of the first few companies Mr Humphrey was also a director 
and authorised signatory” (cited in Mitchell et al., 1998a and 1998b). The strong court 
judgement should have encouraged regulators to investigate and take appropriate 
action. Mitchell et al, (1998a, 1998b) approached the police, the Department of Trade, 
the attorney general, the prime minister and professional bodies, but they all passed the 
buck, claiming that it was someone else’s responsibility. No report or fine has been 
exacted by any professional body or regulator. 
 
Some of the difficulties of pursuing accountancy firms operating from diverse 
locations are highlighted by the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI). About two years prior to its forced closure by the UK authorities 
in 1991, BCCI had been indicted for drug trafficking and money laundering offences 
by the US regulators and had an “international reputation for capital flight, tax fraud, 
and money laundering” (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992, p. 243), 
but its annual accounts continued to receive unqualified audit reports (Arnold and 
 29
Sikka, 2001). As part of their enquiries the US authorities sought access to auditor’s 
files and the US Senate hearings were told that “The audit of BCCI, the financial 
statement, profit and loss balance sheet that was filed in the State of New York was 
certified by Price Waterhouse Luxembourg. When we asked Price Waterhouse U.S. for 
the records to support that, they said, oh, we don't have those, that's Price Waterhouse 
U.K. …We said, can you get them for us? They said, oh, no, that's a separate entity 
owned by Price Waterhouse Worldwide, based in Bermuda. So, here you have 
financial statements, profit and loss, filed in Washington, filed in Virginia, filed in 
Tennessee, filed in New York, and audited by auditors who are beyond the reach of 
law enforcement. So that creates some very, very serious problems” (US Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992, p.245). 
 
Auditing 
 
In the aftermath of unexpected frauds and corporate failures auditors usually come 
under scrutiny. Regulatory and scholarly attention is often fixed on whether auditors 
could have detected or reported ‘red flags’ (Clarke et al’, 2003). However, little 
attention is paid to how the enterprise culture shaped the production of company 
audits. This section provides a brief indication of some practices. 
 
In January 1999, following a $2.5 million fine on PricewaterhouseCoopers for 
violating audit independence rules, primarily relating to ownership of securities in 
client companies, (SEC press release35, 14 January 1999), the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) commissioned a study into the firm’s compliance 
practices. The report (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000) disclosed that 
“a substantial number of PwC professionals, particularly partners, had violations of the 
independence rules, and that many had multiple violations. The review found 
excusable mistakes, but also attributed the violations to laxity and insensitivity to the 
importance of independence compliance … PwC acknowledges that the review 
disclosed widespread independence non-compliance that reflected serious structural 
and cultural problems in the firm” (SEC press release36, 6 January 2000). The study 
said that over 8,000 violations of the rules, in a one month period, were found and the 
firm agreed to revise its compliance procedures. In 2002, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
again came under scrutiny and were fined $5 million for violating auditor 
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independence rules and entering “into impermissible contingent fee arrangements with 
14 public audit clients …” (SEC press release37, 17 July 2002).  
 
Following previous regulatory actions, in 1995, Ernst & Young gave undertakings to 
comply with the auditor independence rules (US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2004). These undertakings were soon to be tested. The SEC learnt that 
for the period 1994 to 2000, contrary to the rules on auditor independence, Ernst & 
Young (EY) entered into a business relationship with software giant PeopleSoft, one of 
its audit clients. This time the SEC prosecuted and a 69 page court judgement stated 
that “The most outrageous were the joint marketing and joint sales activities that 
occurred across the board … day-to-day operations were profit driven and ignored 
considerations of auditor independence in business relationship with PeopleSoft. … 
EY committed repeated violation of the auditor independence standards by conduct 
that was reckless, highly unreasonable and negligent. … The firm paid only 
perfunctory attention to the rules on auditor independence in business dealings with a 
client, and that EY reliance on a “culture of consulting” to achieve compliance with 
the rules on auditor independence was a sham” (US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2004). Ernst & Young were fined $1.7 million, banned for six months 
from securing new audit clients and also put on probation for the next two years. Ernst 
& Young were again censured in March 2007 for violation of auditor independence 
rules38 and fined $1.7 million.  
 
KPMG was also admonished for violating auditor independence rules by holding 
investments in a client company. According to the SEC (press release, 14 January 
2002) “KPMG had a substantial investment in Short-Term Investment Trust (STIT), 
part of the AIM Funds, a collection of mutual funds audited by the firm. … KPMG 
repeatedly confirmed its putative independence from the AIM funds it audited, 
including STIT, during the period in which KPMG was invested in STIT”. In another 
case, in 2005, KPMG were fined $22 million because the firm “willfully aided and 
abetted Xerox's violations of the anti-fraud, reporting, recordkeeping and internal 
controls provisions of the federal securities laws … KPMG violated its obligations to 
disclose to Xerox illegal acts that came to its attention during the Xerox audits” (SEC 
press release, 19 April 2005). 
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In 2003, a [former] Ernst & Young partner was arrested on criminal charges for 
allegedly altering and destroying audit working papers and obstructing investigations 
relating to NextCard (SEC press release, 25 September 2003). He became one of the 
first cases to be tried under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. He pled guilty and admitted 
that “he knowingly altered, destroyed and falsified records with the intent to impede 
and obstruct an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) … by 
not informing the SEC of these alterations and deletions that he knowingly concealed 
and covered up an original version of the documents with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, and influence an investigation of the SEC (Department of Justice press 
release39, 27 January 2005). The Ernst & Young was sentenced to a year in federal 
prison, a fine of $5,000 and two years of supervised release. 
 
In 2005, Deloitte & Touche were fined $50 million to settle charges stemming from its 
audit of Adelphia Communications Corporation. The SEC stated that “Deloitte 
engaged in improper professional conduct and caused Adelphia's violations of the 
recordkeeping provisions of the securities laws because it failed to detect a massive 
fraud … Deloitte failed to design an audit appropriately tailored to address audit risk 
areas that Deloitte had explicitly identified” (SEC press release,  26 April 2005). After 
settlement with the SEC, Deloitte issued a press statement stating that “the client and 
certain of its senior executives and others deliberately misled Deloitte & Touche”. The 
SEC objected to this characterisation and forced the firm to revise its press release 
which ommitted the above sentence40. In 2007, a Deloitte partner responsible for the 
Adelphia audit  was banned for life from conducting audits41. 
 
In September 2005, Japanese regulators arrested four partners of ChuoAoyama 
PricewaterhouseCoopers for allegedly helping executives at Kenebo, an audit client, to 
falsify company accounts. (Financial Times, 14 September 2005). The four were 
suspected of working with two Kanebo executives to produce false consolidated 
financial statements showing that Kanebo's assets exceeded its debts in fiscal year 
2001 and 2002. In reality, its debts exceeded its assets by Y81.9bn and Y80.6bn, 
respectively. Subsequently, the regulator stated that “ChuoAoyama 
PricewaterhouseCoopers admitted the facts charged in the Kanebo accounting fraud scandal42” 
and  that the four “willfully certified Kanebo's falsified annual reports for the five 
periods, ending March 1999, March 2000, March 2001, March 2002 and March 2003, 
 32
as not containing such falsities43”. In an unprecented punishment, the firm’s licence to 
conduct company audits was suspended for a two month period covering July-August 
2006. Subsequently, despite a name change, a number of major clients deserted and in 
August  2007 the firm was disbanded44. 
 
Smaller accounting firms are not immune to the effects of enterprise culture and higher 
profits through questionable practices, as illustrated by the case of Versailles Group, a 
UK listed company and whose founder was convicted of fraud (The Guardian, 26 
March 2004). Attention soon focused on its auditors Messrs Nunn Hayward. A 
disciplinary hearing found that “In 1996, Mr Clough [Versailles finance director] 
arranged for publication of the Versailles accounts, and their circulation to 
shareholders, before the audit was completed. The published accounts contained a 
false audit certificate. When this was discovered, Nunn Hayward signed an audit 
certificate on unchanged accounts after little further work, and these were re-circulated 
to shareholders. In the face of this obvious dishonesty, Nunn Hayward acquiesced in a 
circular to shareholders describing what had happened as "an oversight". The reality 
was that Versailles was too important a client for Nunn Hayward to risk losing … 
[partner] responded that this was "a big fee account" and his firm did not want to 
resign” (Joint Disciplinary Scheme press release45, 25 March 2004).  
 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
This paper has sought to stimulate debates about the contemporary enterprise culture, 
which is often distinguished by its focus on wealth creation. However, the paper has 
argued that it is also accompanied by predatory practices which increase profits, but 
impoverish citizens and societies through the operations of cartels, tax 
avoidance/evasion, bribery, corruption and money laundering. In pursuit of higher 
financial rewards, promotions and status, such practices seem to be crafted and 
sanctioned by highly paid executives at senior levels in organisational structures. In an 
environment of poor regulation, enforcement, secrecy and lack of ethical constraints, 
the occasional investigation by regulators and financial penalties do not seem to deter 
some company executives, or dull the systemic pressures for higher profits and returns. 
Some of the practices may not be criminal, but they have negative effects on the 
welfare of citizens and condemn millions of people to poverty and poor health. 
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 Though appeals to codes of ethics and claims of ‘serving the public interest’ may 
camouflage the capitalist nature of accountancy firms, they too are under systemic 
pressure to increase profits and on occasions have shown a willingness to increase 
profits through predatory behaviour. Behind a wall of secrecy, some firms have 
operated cartels, devised aggressive tax avoidance and evasion schemes, engaged in 
bribery, corruption and money laundering. The rapacious behaviour is also present in 
the external auditing arena, a jurisdiction traditionally considered to be informed by 
professional codes of ethics. Firms do not seem to have been constrained by any notion 
of ethics or morality. Their misdemeanours were not exposed by any professional 
accountancy body, but by whistleblowers, determined parliamentary investigations and 
state-backed regulators. Repeated fines and warnings from regulators did not curb 
violations of rules and anti-social behaviour by accountancy firms. The regulators 
suspended or restricted the operations of some firms, but even that seems to have a 
limited effect as firms seem to be keen to pursue higher profits at almost any cost. 
Some accountancy firms also coldly calculated that revenues from ‘bending the rules’ 
greatly exceeded the penalties and on that basis pursued higher profits. Some firm 
partners seem to have little hesitation in shredding key documents to aid their clients, 
or conceal their own role in some debacles. Such policies are not the result of just one 
or two rotten apples, but appear to be carefully crafted, researched, documented and 
sanctioned at the highest levels in organisations and are indicative of a rampant 
enterprise culture that has little regard of the consequences for citizens. Perhaps, this is 
an inevitable feature of capitalism distinguished by oligopolies where individual firms 
and corporations are so big that it produces a certain kind of arrogance and makes the 
senior people believe that they are somehow beyond the reach of the law, regulators 
and public opinion.  
 
As long as business executives are rewarded for increases in profits there may be 
economic incentives to engage in predatory behaviour. A strong regulatory response 
could suggest that corporations and accountancy firms are corrupt, whilst a relatively 
weak response has evidently failed to curb predatory behaviour and could erode the 
state’s public legitimacy. In principle, higher liability and punishment thresholds have 
a potential to curb predatory practices, but the prospects of that are low as in a 
deregulatory environment accountancy firms are campaigning for ever more liability 
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concessions (Sikka, forthcoming) and despite admission of “criminal wrongdoing” 
(e.g. by KPMG) regulators are reluctant to closedown the offending firms. In any case, 
there are limits to the number of transactions and policies that the regulators can 
scrutinise and will ultimately have to create an environment in which accountancy 
firms have to be mindful of the consequences of anti-social practices. So the challenge 
is to develop a research agenda that scrutinises the anti-social aspects of the enterprise 
culture and develops public policies for constraining predatory behaviour. 
 
Admittedly, the evidence in this paper and the public domain is somewhat limited and 
whether it represents the tip of an iceberg or something more modest is open to 
conjecture. However, at the very least it raises some questions about the nature of 
enterprise culture embraced by some accountancy firms. In contemporary folklore, 
audit committees, non-executive directors and notions of corporate social 
responsibility are advanced as ways of curbing predatory behaviour, but even such 
modest mechanisms are absent from major accountancy firms. The ‘transparency’ and 
‘accountability’ debates applied to corporations are rarely applied to accountancy 
firms. The bourgeoning corporate social responsibility literature rarely focuses upon 
the anti-social practices of accounting firms. Seemingly, despite evidence of anti-social 
behaviour, their accountability and social responsibility has been organised off the 
political agenda.  
 
Accountancy firms are on a collision course with civil society. Their involvement in 
bribery and corruption forces ordinary consumers to pay higher prices and also 
degrades the quality of life for millions of people. Their involvement in money 
laundering challenges the very fabric of society. Elected governments take months and 
years to develop effective tax laws and collect revenues for investment in social 
infrastructure and possible eradication of poverty, but accountancy firms seem to have 
developed structures and mechanisms to undermine them. We can all be persuaded to 
vote for governments that promise to invest public revenues in education, healthcare, 
pensions or public transport, but the purveyors of enterprise culture exercise the final 
veto by shrinking the tax base and eroding tax revenues through a variety of complex 
schemes. Thus the practices of major firms pose serious challenges to the very nature 
of representative democracy. 
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 APPENDIX 1 
 
ACCOUNTANCY FIRM INCOME AND SIZE
 
Firm    Global Fees                OPERATIONS 
                US$bn    Employees    Countries    Offices
   
*PricewaterhouseCoopers 25.2  147,000  150    766  
 
**Deloitte & Touche  20.0  135,000   99    670 
 
**Ernst & Young  18.4  114,000  140    700 
 
**KPMG   16.9  113,000  148    717 
 
*Grant Thornton     2.8     22,000  113    521 
 
 
Note: Information as per firm websites. 
 
* 2007 annual review. 
** 2006 annual reviews. 
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1 Their ranks are now being swelled by mergers of medium-size firms. Recently, Grant 
Thornton merged with RSM Robson Rhodes.  
2 World Bank’s 2006 estimates for GDP of each country are available on 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf; accessed 
25 June 2007. 
3 http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/113-07; accessed 2 August 2007. 
4 http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/212002.htm; 14 October 2005). 
5 http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html  
6 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm 
7 http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20251.htm 
8 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6654825.stm 
9 This was a large Washington DC based US bank. In 2005 it was bought by PNC 
Financial Services Group.  
10 http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=223923; accessed 2 April 2007. 
11 The HealthSouth scandal revealed auditors Ernst & Young’s responsibilities 
included inspecting toilets and ceilings for stains, making sure trash receptacles had 
liners, and attesting that magazines in the waiting areas were displayed in an orderly 
fashion. The $2.6 million fee was classified as part of the “audit fee” (Wall Street 
Journal, 11 June 2003). 
12 Interview on 5 April 2002; download available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regulation/interviews/turner.html 
13 Following the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Act 2000, UK accountancy firms 
trading as LLPs need to publish audited accounts. The regulators permitted accounting 
firms to formulate the contents of such accounts through a Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP) issued in 2002 and revised in 2006 (Consultative Committee of 
Accountancy Bodies, 2006). 
14http://www.agcm.it/agcm_eng/COSTAMPA/E_PRESS.NSF/0/991a5848bc88040dc1
25688f0056851d?OpenDocument 
15 http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_tax_547.html 
16 http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html 
17 http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060409/news_1b9kpmg.html 
18 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January07/acostapleapr.pdf 
19 http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/TaxDiv2007ResultsAppx.pdf 
20 The court judgement is available at 
http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special&id=56 
21 Also see http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=98916; accessed 23 
March 2004. 
22 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May07/eyindictmentpr.pdf 
23 Available at http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/Ernst&Young2007taxindictment.pdf 
24http://money.cnn.com/2007/06/14/news/newsmakers/bc.ernstyoung.tax.employee.reu
t/ 
25 For further details see 
http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/decisions/documents/vat/17914.pdf 
26 For further details see http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/892.html 
27 For further details see 
http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/judgmentfiles/j3463/Spc00636.doc 
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28 http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/05/16/1084646069195.html; accessed 11 June 
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30 http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/August/07_civ_620.html; accessed 17 Aug 2007. 
31 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/news/pr2005/100.html; accessed 3 September 2007. 
32 http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/news/pr2006/001.html 
33 http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/071801_psimorgenthau.htm 
34 This episode is also explained by James Kindler, Chief Assistant District Attorney 
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